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Evidence from the international research community shows 
that careful management of nature results in benefits to 
people’s wellbeing. Poor people especially depend more 
heavily on the quality of the ecosystems and have less access 
to substitutes when they are degraded. Making meaningful 
impacts in the way ecosystems are managed requires 
governments to step in and scale up, but the evidence also 
shows that empowered communities can make strong calls to 
enact and implement change at the local level. Positive 
incentives like payments for ecosystem services (PES) and 
other forms of conditional transfers can provide important 
signals to enact this behavioural change into positive actions. 
Carefully designed, these incentives can also contribute to the 
wellbeing of people, especially poor and vulnerable groups. 
New tools emerge that can help with scaling up and dealing 
with inevitable trade-offs, but more efforts are needed to bring 
this information closer to those making decisions. This case 
study accompanies a Guidance for Practitioners that helps to 
bridge this space by: 1) making evidence accessible, bringing 
the latest evidence from research on PES in theory and practice 
with documented case studies written for practitioners; and 2) 
supporting capacity building to ‘train the trainers’, through 
teaching modules which can be used to promote capacity 
building of practitioners. 
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The Hilsa Conservation Programme (HSP) in Bangladesh combines environmental and social 
objectives, using a mix of regulation (bans) and payments for ecosystem services (PES) as 
compensation. PES rewards good ecosystem management agreements (such as improving soil 
conservation or refraining from damaging activities like overfishing) expected to result in ecosystem 
benefits like cleaner water and reduced carbon emissions (Engel, 2015; Wunder, 2015), or, in this case, 
an improvement in provisioning services, that is bigger juvenile hilsa fish (Islam et al., 2016).  
The primary goal of this scheme is the conservation of hilsa and associated biodiversity, but as it is 
funded through a national Vulnerable Group Feeding (VGF) programme, which aims to reduce food 
insecurity (Ahmed et al., 2009; Uraguchi, 2011), it is intended also to improve the socioeconomic 
condition of affected fishers living inside and around the sanctuary areas (DoF, 2012; Haldar and Ali, 
2014). 
Political support 
Hilsa fish (Tenulosa ilisha) are an important source of income and cultural identity in Bangladesh. They 
represent 11 per cent of the total catch in the country, and provide jobs to over 2.5 million people (Islam 
et al., 2016).  
Once a cheap fish affordable even for the poor, hilsa catches have gradually declined over the last 30 
years to reach a low point of only 0.19 million tonnes in 1991 to 1992, then stagnated until 2001 to 
2002. This prompted the government of Bangladesh to declare five hilsa sanctuaries in 2003 and 
seasonally ban the fishing of hilsa at important stages in its life cycle. This ban is designed to allow 
mature fish to reproduce and juvenile hilsa (jatka) to grow, thus achieving better sizes (and prices). It 
also allows juvenile fish to mature and reproduce to replenish the overall stock. To compensate for lost 
earnings during the closure, and to incentivise compliance with the new regulations, the government 
started providing affected fishing communities with rice and alternative income-generating activities.  
 
 
Figure 1. PES in the incentive portfolio for marine conservation in Bangladesh 
 
 
Source: Mohammed, 2015. 
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The HCP has grabbed much political attention because the programme is regarded as part of a poverty 
reduction strategy and sustainable development. Another reason is that the hilsa fish itself is very 
popular. The media have played a big part with programme-related news regularly published in the 
country. The HCP has a strong approach to awareness-raising as part of the incentives, reaching 
people through television, radio, boat rallies and local workshops (see Figure 1). Recent economic 
studies are generating new information on the economic importance of hilsa fish to Bangladesh and its 
links to poverty alleviation (Porras et al., 2017b; Porras et al., 2017c). The studies show that hilsa 
fishing is a high-value activity with a guaranteed market for its supply, with prices significantly higher 
than for other types of fish.  
Sustainable financing 
The programme is fully funded by the government of Bangladesh, through a national Vulnerable Group 
Feeding (VGF) programme, which aims to reduce food insecurity (Ahmed et al., 2009; Uraguchi, 2011). 
and takes about 5.5 per cent of the total Department of Fisheries (DoF) development budget (about 
1813Tk million or US$23 million for 2014-15). The programme is funded solely by the Bangladesh 
government. The related personnel are funded from the revenue budget whereas the cost of the 
compensation is met through development budget.  
A proposal for long-term financial viability is through the National Hilsa Conservation Fund. This legally 
independent grant-making institution could be used to channel a range of financing modalities, both 
private and public; for example, earmarking a percentage of government earnings from hilsa sales and 
exports, and introducing a fee to users (processors and retailers) to generate resources to implement a 
payment for the ecosystem service (PES) programme.  
The idea has been shared with top-level government policymakers who have shown interest in its 
implementation. Two financial lines (6605 and 5390) have been created by the Ministry of Finance. 
Currently there is no specific legislation that ensures allocation of funding over time. 
Institutional set-up 
The programme is led by the Department of Fisheries (DoF) and supported by various other 
government agencies to channel the food incentive to the fishers affected, see Figure 2.  
The process of finalising the list of food incentive recipients and allocating and distributing the food 
(rice) is lengthy and complex. It requires 13 separate steps and involves every tier of Bangladesh’s 
administrative hierarchy, from meetings at the union parishad (local council), to approval from the 
director general of the Department of Fisheries, with several layers in between deciding how rice is 
distributed to the fishers. The transaction costs however are very low; administration and transaction 
costs account for 918 Bangladeshi Tk (equivalent to US$11.89) for each metric tonne of rice distributed, 
or 3 per cent of the total cost.  
Local councils present a list of jatka fishers to higher levels of administration. Such a lengthy system, 
without clear-cut targeting leads to problems like favouritism and elite capture. Since 2013 a new 
system has been started where local primary school teachers prepare a list of the hilsa fishers in their 
community, and more recently the introduction of an ID card.    
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Figure 2. Institutions: how does the Jatka PES in Bangladesh work?  
 
 
Source: Adapted from Islam and Habib , 2013 
Systems and tools for effective implementation  
Targeting strategies: There is no prescribed targeting, although the programme aims to “reach the 
poorest and most vulnerable fishers” (DoF, 2012; Haldar and Ali, 2014). Practical criteria used includes 
“genuine jatka fishers”, those who are “fully dependent” on fishing for their livelihoods, and those 
without assets such as agricultural land or boats (Mome, 2014). The government identified a total of 
approximately 287,000 fisher households from 20 coastal districts, covering 91 sub-districts (locally 
known as Upazila), who are directly affected by the declaration of sanctuaries, based on the 2004 
census data. Out of these, 226,852 vulnerable households were selected to receive food 
compensation. However, participation has been affected by inclusion errors (food-secure households 
were included) and exclusion errors (food-insecure households were not included), see Uraguchi 
(2011).   
Payments to participants: Fishers affected by the fishing ban are entitled to receive compensation of 
40kg of rice per household per month for four months.  
Conditionality: A ‘mobile court’ team with support from the police and other agencies operates at the 
subdistrict level to enforce the fisheries’ regulations. The court operates under the Mobile Court 
Ordinance 2007, giving powers to the magistrate to punish offenders immediately at the site of the 
offence. However, a lack of human, physical and financial resources has been obstructing its role in 
effective monitoring and enforcement. This limits the ability to properly enforce the fishing ban, and 
cases of illegal jatka fishing have recently increased, despite a sharp drop in the early years of the 
conservation programme. Other issues include the fact that some hilsa sanctuaries have not been 
accurately demarcated, and that the banned monofilament net used for juvenile hilsa fishing is still 
openly produced and marketed.  
Monitoring, policing and enforcement: The country’s navy, coastguard, police, Rapid Action 
Battalion, air force and Border Guards Bangladesh help run ‘mobile courts’ to enforce the fisheries 
regulations. However, the programme now has a limited level of evaluation and feedback channels.  
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Ability to demonstrate impact  
Environmental impacts: there are no counterfactuals or before/after impact evaluations of the 
programme. There is a perception that the hilsa catch had declined in the pre-intervention period, both 
in the volume of the catch and the size of individual fish. It has been assumed that the management 
interventions have increased the availability of large hilsa and a large number of brood stock, both of 
which have positive impacts on population regeneration.  
Site visits suggest that the set of measures seems to be working, and the reported hilsa stock shows 
signs of recovering. Although there are no counterfactuals or before/after impact evaluations, recent 
studies suggest that the ban has had a positive impact on the stock in the following ways:  
 
i) A higher number of mature fish at maturity stages than in the other adjacent areas (Rahman et al., 
2012), as well as a higher number of ‘spent fish’, for example, fish that have recently completed 
spawning. 
 
ii) Increased production of hatchlings and juveniles: Rahman et al. (2013) recorded about eight times as 
many eggs and juveniles in 2011 than in the base year 2007-2008, attributed to the 11-day fishing ban 
in the spawning grounds of hilsa during the peak spawning period.  
 
iii) Positive impact of the HCP on the finfish and shellfish biodiversity: evaluations by Islam et al. (2016) 
in several fish sanctuaries (Shariatpur, Chandpur, Paatuakhai and Bhola) suggest that the temporal 
fishing ban is impacting positively on the fish and shellfish biodiversity within all the four sanctuary 
areas.  
Bigger and better fish sizes sell at much better prices and bring higher profits across the value chains. 
The flavour and characteristics of Bangladesh hilsa make it a valuable commodity, fetching as much as 
US$25 per kilo in niche Dhaka and foreign markets. This is good news for the fishing industry and 
exports in Bangladesh, which already represents 4.3 per cent of GDP (DoF, 2012).  
Better research on the environmental impacts of the ban need to take place because many things can 
affect the size of the fish stock. Conditionality and monitoring are difficult to enforce and measure, due 
to the open access nature of the resource, fishers breaking the ban at night to elude the coastguards, 
or because of pirates attacking fishers and taking their catch away. Proposals for local communities and 
fishers to have a more active role in monitoring are put forward to try to tackle these issues.  
Additionally, the programme should approach non-fishing related stresses, such as upstream damming, 
river diversion, siltation and pollution, which affect the health of the water ecosystems.   
Socioeconomic impacts: Food assistance has been provided to fishers under the hilsa management 
plan since 2004 (see Table 1) and the programme’s reach has expanded considerably in that time. 
Nearly 223,000 families received about 36 thousand metric tonnes of rice across 88 sub-districts.  
However, households report receiving only 25-32kg each while DoF officers say that each household 
receives 35-38kg. Fishers have also stated that the government does not provide all the resources 
required to distribute the rice, and so additional costs are met by selling a proportion of the rice 
intended for their household, an amount (25-32kg) they claim is inadequate. In addition, household size 
does not affect the amount of rice received, which could be particularly problematic for bigger 
households in greater need of food. Furthermore, during the fishing ban periods the price of fish goes 
up and thus fish consumption in many households falls to zero, increasing the risk of malnutrition, 
especially for children and pregnant women. Finally, fishers have pointed out that during the fishing ban 
they also need to pay for other things, such as groceries and children’s schooling, for which no support 
is available. 
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Table 1. Distribution of grain compensation in the Hilsa Conservation Programme, Bangladesh 
(2004-2014) 
 
Financial year Number of households Rice (Kg/HH/month) Months Total rice allocated 
(Metric tonnes) 
2004-05 33,300 10 3 1,000 
2006-07 103,000 15 1 1,546 
2007-08 145,335 10 3 4,360 
2008-09 143,252 10 3 5,731 
2009-10 164,740 30 4 19,769 
2010-11 186,264 20 4 14,471 
2011-12 186,264 30 4 22,352 
2012-13 206,229 30 4 24,748 
2013-14 226,852 40 4 36,296 
Grand total of food distributed 130,272 
 
Note: In 2005-2006 food assistance was not provided. 
Support for alternative income generation activities (AIGA) has been offered by the HCP since 2009, 
including training in livestock rearing and running small businesses. So far, 21,690 households across 
four districts have engaged with this programme, receiving training and benefits worth BDT 7540 
(equivalent to $US97) per household. The reported beneficiary selection and administration amount is 
only 0.7 per cent of the programme’s total costs. Households that participated in the programme 
increased their supply of food as a temporary buffer to seasonal asset depletion in addition to earning 
highly needed income during slack seasons.  
Market monopolies in hilsa prices reduce potential benefits to poor fishers: Hilsa fish are highly 
valued, and their prices are significantly higher than other types of fish. Securing a supply of bigger fish 
should, in theory, benefit the fisher. However, the hilsa fish market is divided into two very different 
trading systems (see Figure 3), where fishers are obliged in practice to sell their catch to a pre-agreed 
buyer at highly controlled prices (Porras et al., 2017b). Buyers often provide upfront loans in exchange 
for the catch, effectively lowering the fishers’ bargaining power to zero. Wholesaler buyers (known as 
aratdars), on the other hand, trade through instant auctions, where information about supply of fish in 
other markets in the city is made immediately available through tight networks of informants. This 
means that there are many possibilities of making good profits from the high consumer demand. Better 
governance of markets can help break this monopoly and help pass profits down the value chain to 
fishers, making the activity more profitable and bringing costs in line with revenues. 
Addressing fairness in PES: The cost of this fishing prohibition falls almost completely on the fishers. 
Already poor, uneducated and in debt, they are not bearing this easily. Lacking access to fish protein, 
the rice compensation they receive is good and welcomed, but not enough to provide nutrition to their 
large families. Their low levels of education prevent them from finding alternative income. Importantly, 
incentives should be extended to all fishers affected by the ban; at the moment only hilsa fishers are 
entitled to compensation, although non-hilsa fishers cannot operate during the ban (Islam et al., 2016). 
The lack of suitable compensation to other people affected across the chain puts further pressure on 
fishers to attempt illegal fishing. Although there are alternative income-generating activities (AIGA), the 
subscription is very low. This urgently highlights the need to review the type of training on offer in a way 
that responds to the needs and skills of the fishing families. Porras et al. (2017c) make suggestions for 
inclusive financing and insurance options, alongside or instead of the rice PES payment, and involving 
other players along the hilsa value chain to help spread out the benefits of investments.  
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Lessons 
Fishery policies are particularly vulnerable to failure. The open access characteristic of fishing as an 
occupation make compliance difficult. Trade is often informal and non-regulated, with multiple pressure 
points across the supply chain that can render a PES incentive invalid. Attention to the social 
component of the policies is particularly important in the case of artisanal fisheries, as the main actors 
affected by regulation tend to be poor and vulnerable. 
While economic incentive mechanisms of this kind have been hailed as the most cost-effective and 
efficient way to manage natural resources and alleviate poverty, their efficiency depends on how much 
the incentives cost to implement. The lengthy administration chain from the national government to 
fishers have low reported transaction costs, but it is long and time-consuming. Other less reported costs 
include potential bribery; for example, local union leaders withholding some of the rice for their own 
costs even if these are covered by the programme. There have been concerns regarding equity and 
political interference in the distribution of compensation, elite capture and high levels of inclusion and 
exclusion error (Haldar and Ali, 2014; Matin, 2000; Matin and Hulme, 2003; Rahman et al., 2012). 
Impact on the ecosystem is difficult to measure, especially because of the open access nature of the 
resource, and the absence of counterfactual. 
However, this programme represents a step forward, linking social and environmental authorities. There 
is a perceived increased number of mature hilsa fish, hatchings and juveniles with important benefits on 
supply chains. Additional work — including the potential rethinking of the PES format and providing the 
`right’ type of incentives — can help improve the programme’s impact on poverty alleviation; for 
example, addressing the problems of financial exclusion by providing appropriate financial products to 
fishers. Importantly, the programme should also consider wider watershed management approaches 
and mitigate non-fishing related stresses, such as upstream damming, river diversion, siltation and 
pollution that affect the health of the fish stock (Mohammed, 2015).  
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Figure 3. Marine PES and the Hilsa value chain in Bangladesh 
 
Source: Porras et al., 2017c.
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